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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the case . 
This case concerns claims for damages by property owners, Appellant Don Halvorson 
("Halvorson") and his wife Charlotte (collectively "Halvorsons"), against Respondent North 
Latah County Highway District (the "Highway District") resulting from the Highway District's 
activities on a segment of Camps Canyon Road, a public highway under Highway District 
jurisdiction. Halvorsons assert that the width of Camps Canyon Road is limited to the actual 
surface of the roadway and that the Highway District's placement of gravel on the road in 2006, 
which widened the road surface between six inches and two feet, the Highway District's routine 
road grading and snow plowing and the Highway District's issuance of an approach permit to a 
neighbor violated Halvorsons' constitutionally protected property rights. The District Court 
determined that Camps Canyon Road is a public road established by public use with a minimum 
fifty foot width pursuant to Idaho Code $40-23 12. In its Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs' 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
District Court concluded that the "Highway District has acted within its authority to maintain 
Camps Canyon Road." R, Vol. VII, pp.1454-1484. The Opinion and Order granted 
Respondents' summary judgment motion and dismissed all of Halvorsons' claims. Halvorsons' 
numerous constitutional claims, including takings claims, procedural due process claims, 
Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claims, were dismissed primarily 
because the Highway District acted at all times within its legal authority. The District Court 
found that Halvorsons did not request a validation hearing under LC. § 40-203A(1) and 
concluded that the Highway District may, but is not required to, initiate validation hearings when 
no validation hearing is requested. The District Court also concluded that the Highway District's 
issuance of a driveway permit to Halvorsons' neighbor's did not affect Halvorsons' property 
interests, fell within exceptions to liability under LC. § 6-904 B and did not require a due process 
hearing. The District Court dismissed Halvorsons' tort claims that allegedly arose prior to May 
8, 2007 for failure to timely file a notice of tort claim under LC. 8 6-905, dismissed Halvorsons' 
claims against Respondent Highway District commissioners and employee Dan Payne pursuant 
to exceptions to governmental liability under I.C. 5 6-904 and I.C. 5 6-904 B and dismissed 
Halvorsons' remaining claims for failing to establish a prima facie case, for failing to state any 
cognizable claim and for prosecuting criminal offenses Halvorsons have no authority to 
prosecute. The District Court found without basis or merit and denied Halvorsons' various other 
motions, including those from the extensive list found in Plaintiffs 'Motions for Partial Summary 
Judgments and Other Motions Submitted Januay 24, 2009, and Brief andlor from other rulings 
by the District Court on Halvorsons' earlier motions for declaratory judgment and summary 
judgment, and denied Halvorsons' motions for reconsideration. 
Course of proceedings. 
Halvorsons filed suit against Respondents on March 3,2008. Numerous preliminary 
motions were filed by the parties and decided by the District Court. Halvorsons filed a motion 
for partial summary judgment with other motions on January 26,2009. Respondents filed a 
motion for summary judgment on February 3,2009. A hearing on all outstanding motions took 
place on March 3,2009. The District Court issued the Opinion and Order on May 11,2009 on 
all motions, granting Respondents' motion for summary judgment dismissing all of Halvorsons' 
claims. The District Court awarded attorney fees and costs to Respondents on August 3, 2009. 
Halvorson appealed on June 19,2009. 
Statement of facts. 
1. Camps Canyon Road has been continually used by the public at least since the 
1930's. Affidavit of Orland Arneberg ("Arneberg Affidavit"), par. 5 and 7, R, Vol. IV, p. 645. 
2. At least since 1974, the Highway District has maintained Camps Canyon Road as 
needed for safe travel by grading and/or adding gravel. Affidavit of Dan Payne ("Payne 
Affidavit"), par. 2 and 4, R, Vol. IV, p. 637. 
3. Following notice and public hearing, and pursuant to Idaho Code 5 40-202(1), the 
Highway District adopted the official map of the highway system under its jurisdiction and 
recorded that official map under Instrument No. 35617, records of Latah County, Idaho on 
November 18, 1986. Camps Canyon Road was a public highway prior to adoption of the official 
map and has been listed on the Highway District's official map from its adoption in 1986 to the 
present as a public highway under jurisdiction of the Highway District. Carscallen Affidavit, R, 
Vol. IV, p. 642. 
4. Although improved over the years, Camps Canyon Road follows the same 
approximate centerline now that it has since the early 1930's, by Orland Arneberg's personal 
observation, and since 1974, by Dan Payne's personal observation. Arneberg Affidavit, par. 8, 
R, Vol. IV, p. 645; Paylie Affidavit, par. 8,R, Vol. IV, p.638. Larry Hodge, licensed Idaho 
surveyor, opines that based upon a comparison of historic aerial maps that the location and 
course of Camps Canyon Road has not been changed between 1940 and 2004. Affidavit of 
Larry Hodge ("Hodge Affidavit"), par. 5,R, Vol. VI, p. 1144. 
5. In 2005 and 2006, to improve road safety for increased public vehicular traffic, the 
Highway District widened the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road on its southerly side (the 
side owned by the Wagners opposite the real property owned by Halvorsons) by drilling and 
blasting bedrock, adding gravel to level the road surface, sloping and seeding the banks on that 
side, extending the culvert under the road by approximately four feet (4') and improving the 
ditch on that southerly side of the road. Payne Affidavit, par. 6, R, Vol. IV, p. 637. After the 
improvements to Wagners' side were complete, Camps Canyon Road was widened slightly in 
2006, meaning less than a foot or two, on the Halvorsons' side of the road when the Highway 
District spread gravel over the traveled portion of the roadway. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 4, 
R, Vol. VI, p. 1210. 
6. After the Highway District improvements in 2006, the traveled surface of Camps 
Canyon Road did not exceed approximately 23 K feet in width in the general vicinity of 
Halvorsons'property and averaged approximately 21 feet in width in that same stretch. Payne 
Affidavit, par. 7, R, Vol. IV, p. 638. 
7. In addition to using and maintaining the traveled surface of Camps Canyon Road 
and in order to properly grade and drain the road for safe public travel, the Highway District 
must maintain the cut slope, ditch and culvert on the side opposite Halvorsons' property and the 
Highway District must utilize the fill slope adjacent to the traveled surface on Halvorsons' side 
of Camps Canyon Road for structural support for the traveled surface and for snow removal and 
storage in winter months. Payne Affidavit, par. 9, R, Vol. IV, p. 638. 
8. A minimum 50 foot width is reasonably necessary to properly maintain public 
highways in rural Latah County, including Camps Canyon Road, that are safe and reasonably 
convenient for public travel. Payne Affidavit, par. 10, R, Vol. IV, p. 638. 
9. Halvorsons acquired property along Camps Canyon Road in 1996. Halvorsons' 
Deed, R, Vol. 5, p. 1105. 
10. In 1997, Halvorsons constructed a fence on the steep fill slope of Camps Canyon 
Road which, in places, is within fifteen feet (15') of the centerline of Camps Canyon Road. The 
Highway District's essential maintenance activities, of road grading and snow plowing cannot, 
given the steepness of the slope on Halvorsons' property, be undertaken without some gravel or 
snow reaching Halvorsons' fence. The Highway District has been diligent in its efforts to avoid 
causing any damage to Halvorsons' fence or property. Payne Affidavit, par. 12, R, Vol. N ,  p. 
639. 
11. Since 2005 and 2006, the only significant activities that have been undertaken by 
the Highway District on Camps Canyon Road in the area of Halvorsons' real property are 
graveling, road grading and snow plowing. These activities are essential to proper maintenance 
of all public roads. These activities and vehicular use contribute to the movement of gravel 
particularly toward the sides of a road. In the grading process, most gravel is brought back 
toward the road center, but inevitably some gravel moves outward, which serves to stabilize and 
support the road but does result in minimal, necessary widening of the road over time. Payne 
Second Affidavit, par. 5, R, Vol. VI, pp. 1210-121 1. 
12. All public highway use and maintenance on Camps Canyon Road by the Highway 
District in the vicinity of Halvorsons' real property, including cut slope to fill slope, has occurred 
and lies within the Highway District's minimum 50 foot wide right-of-way. Payne Affidavit, 
par. 10 and 11, R, Vol. IV, p. 638. 
13. On or about March, 2006, Robert Wagner, who was in the process of building a 
residence, applied to the Highway District, using the Highway District's standard form, to obtain 
a permit for an approach onto Camps Canyon Road from Wagners' real property. Highway 
District foreman Dan Payne met with Mr. Wagner who showed Mr. Payne a post next to the road 
which Mr. Wagner said represented his southern property line. North of that post was an old 
driveway that used to lead to a home and outbuildings on Mr. Wagner's property. At least 50 
feet further north of that driveway, Mr. Wagner had begun constmction of a driveway which he 
wanted to be the location for his approach permit. Mr. Payne approved his approach permit 
application for that location. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 6, R, Vol. VI, p. 121 1. 
14. On or about April, 2006, Mr. Wagner told Mr. Payne that Halvorson had 
complained that the driveway approach was on the Halvorsons' real property. Mr. Payne 
reviewed Wagners' Deed to Wagners' real property, and verified by inspection that the approach 
for which the permit had been issued was located well within Wagner's property. Payne Second 
Affidavit, par. 7, R, Vol. VI, pp. 121 1-1212. 
15. On or about June, 2006, Mr. Wagner told Mr. Payne that Halvorson had obtained a 
survey of the area and, based on that survey, that he wanted Mr. Wagner to move his driveway. 
Mr. Wagner filled out a new application and showed Mr. Payne the location, which was at least 
one hundred feet north of the original, permitted approach. Mr. Payne approved this second 
application on June 9,2006. R, Vol. VI, pp. 1215-1216. Dan Payne revoked the first permit and 
threw it away as it was no longer valid. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 9, R, Vol. VI, p. 1212. 
16. Mr. Wagner proceeded over the next weekend to construct the new driveway and he 
had the rock used in construction of the first driveway pulled onto his property and filled in the 
cut that was made for the first driveway with soil. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 10, R, Vol. VI, 
pp. 1212. 
17. The Highway District has delegated to its foremen the responsibility to review and 
issue approach permits. Payne Second Affidavit, par. 12, R, Vol. VI, pp. 1212-1213; Second 
Affidavit of Dan Carscallen filed herein on February 2,2009 ("Carscallen Second Affidavit"), 
par. 7,R,Vol. V1,p. 1159. 
18. Halvorsons have not filed any petition with the Highway District to initiate a 
validation proceeding under Idaho Code section 40-203 A. Carscallen Second Affidavit, par. 8, 
R, Vol. VI, p.1159. 
19. Halvorsons filed a Tort Claim Notice with the Highway District on November 6, 
2007. This is the only tort claim notice that has been filed by Halvorsons with the Highway 
District. Carscallen Second Affidavit, par. 3, R, Vol. VI, p. 1158. 
20. Key public records related to this case are the following: 
a. Instrument No. 501677, records of Latah County, Idaho ("Wagners' Deed" to 
"Wagners' real property," as defined below). 
b. Instrument No. 42441 1, records of Latah County, Idaho ("Halvorsons' Deed" to 
"Halvorsons' real property"). 
c. Instrument No. 57421, records of Latah County, Idaho ("191 1 Deed"). 
d. 1940 aerial photo, with mapping annotations, records of Latah County, Idaho 
("1940 aerial"). 
e. 2004 aerial photo, records of Latah County, Idaho ("2004 aerial"). 
f. Instrument No. 506484, records of Latah County, Idaho ("July, 2006 Survey") 
g. Amended Record of Survey, Instrument No. 513819, records of Latah County, 
Idaho ("May, 2007 Survey"), which describes the boundaries of the Wagners' real 
property, being, for purposes of this Affidavit, the "2.78 AC+" parcel noted on the 
May, 2007 survey contiguous to Camps Canyon Road. 
Defendants' Second Record Supplement in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, par. 2, R, Vol. V, pp. 1105, 1107-1 115. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the District Court improperlv manted Respondents' motion for summary judgment. 
Whether Respondents are entitled to an award of attornev fees on appeal. 
Respondents are claiming attorney fees on appeal based upon (i) Idaho Code § 12-121 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and I.A.R. 41(a) for reasons that Halvorson has pursued all issues raised by the 
appeal either frivolously, unreasonably or without legal basis or without factual support and 
Respondents will be prevailing parties on appeal; and (ii) Idaho Code 5 12-1 17 and and I.A.R. 
41(a) for the reason that Halvorson, as a party against whom judgment on this appeal will be 
entered, has acted in this appellate proceeding without a reasonable basis in fact or law and the 
Highway District, as a "taxing district" under Idaho law and as the prevailing party on all issues 
in this appeal will be entitled to receive an award of reasonable attorney fees. Applying Rule 
54(e)(3) I.R.C.P. factors, Respondents will be entitled to the full amount of attorney fees 
incurred in this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction. 
Judge Kerrick adeptly organized the Opinion in this action by dividing Halvorsons' 
voluminous and confusing claims and arguments into three (3) analytical parts. The first part 
focused on issues dealing with status of Camps Canyon Road. The District Court's findings and 
conclusions on those issues provided the primary basis for analyzing the remaining two (2) parts, 
namely, Halvorsons' due process claims and a smattering of remaining claims. Respondents' 
briefing on the numerous motions before the District Court had employed a similar approach. To 
simplify review of the lower court judgment, this brief will address issues on appeal within the 
conceptual framework utilized by the District Court. In the event Respondents' Brief fails to 
address any issues raised by Halvorson, such failure or omission will have been inadvertent and 
likely attributable to an inability to understand Halvorson's argument(s). More particular 
briefings on issues raised prior to the summary judgment motions that are the subject of this 
appeal have been made as part of the Clerk's Record On Appeal and are offered by this 
reference, if necessary, to set forth Respondents' argument(s) on any such issues. 
B. Standard of review of the summarv judgment before this Court. 
The standard of review of the summary judgment before this Court is as set forth in 
Sprinkler Irrigation Company, Inc. v. John Deere Insurance Company, Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 85 
P.3d 667 (2004), a case that shares certain, common issues with the instant appeal, as follows: 
The standard of review is the same standard used by the district court ruling on 
the summary judgment motion. Baker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 748, 979 P.2d 
619, 621 (1999). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). All disputed facts are to be 
construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving 
party. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 529, 887 P.2d 1034, 
1036 (1994). "I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that the adverse party may not rest upon 
mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts 
showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 
Idaho 322, 327, 48 P.3d 651, 656 (2002) (citations omitted). "Affidavits 
supporting or opposing the motion for summary judgment 'shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.' " Id. "The 
admissibility of the evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of 
or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold question to be 
answered before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule 
to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial." 
Id. "Summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party bearing the 
burden of proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case." Id. 
Evidentiary rulings shall be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Perty 
v. Magic Valley Reg% Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 50, 995 P.2d 816 (2000). Upon 
review to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court inquires: 
(1) whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether it acted 
within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id; 
Swallow v. Emergency Med. ofldaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 
(2003) (citing State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998); Sun Valley 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 
(1991)). 
. . .  
Upon moving for summary judgment, the moving party must show the absence of 
a genuine issue of material fact. Quinlan v. Idaho Comm'n for Pardons and 
Parole, 138 Idaho 726, 729, 69 P.3d 146, 149 (2003). The burden then shifts to 
the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Id. 
The nonmoving party must come forward and produce evidence to set forth 
specific facts showing a genuine issue of material fact. Id. The nonmoving party 
must present more than speculation or a mere scintilla of evidence to create a 
genuine issue. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 1 19 Idaho 514, 517, 808 
P.2d 851, 854 (1991). Failure to do so will result in an order granting summary 
judgment. Quinlan, 138 Idaho at 729,69 P.3d at 149. 
Sprinkler, 139 Idaho at 671-674, 85 P. 3d at 695-698. 
C. Status of Camps Canvon Road. 
Camps Canyon Road is a public highway established through vublic use. 
The unrehted facts on this record from Respondents' affidavits establish that Camps 
Canyon Road is a public highway established by prescription. Camps Canyon Road is 
referenced as a "County Road" in the 191 1 Deed, and, beyond that, by Orland Arneberg's 
recollections of public use in the 1930's and, more recently by Highway District foreman Dan 
Payne's continuous observations and of the public use and public work since 1974. Arneberg 
Afidavit, R, Vol. IV, p. 645; Payne Afjdavit, R, Vo1. IV, p. 637, Carscallen Afjdavit, R, Vol. 
IV, p. 642. The Highway District also conducted a public hearing under authority of Idaho Code 
§ 40-202 prior to adopting the official map of the Highway District in 1986, which map lists 
Camps Canyon Road as a public highway under jurisdiction of the Highway District. Carscallen 
Affidavit, R, Vol. IV, p. 642. 
The District Court found that the Halvorsons "do not refute the fact that Camps Canyon 
Road is a public highway through public use" as established by Highway District affidavits, 
Opinion and Order, R, Vol. VII, p. 1549. Moreover, the District Court determined Halvorsons 
had "concurred that the road is a public highway established by prescription within the Plaintiffs' 
current motion for summary judgment." Id. at p. 1458, citing Plaintiffs ' Motion for Partial 
Summary judgments and Other Motions SubmittedJanuary 26, 2009, and Brief at 29-3 I ,  R, Vol. 
V, pp. 946-948. Halvorsons have also confirmed their agreement in other briefing filed with the 
trial that Camps Canyon Road existed as a public highway by prescription, including by making 
this statement: 
Further, Plaintiffs do not dispute Camps Canyon Road was at some time used for 
a period of five years which may have coincided with being worked and dept up 
at the public expense. If as an element of the specific issue to be adjudicated and 
for this motion only, Plaintiffs do not dispute Camps Canyon Road existed as an 
unrecorded prescriptive roadihighwaylright of way, as is where is until the 
alterations in 1996. 
Plaintiffs ' Reply Brief to Defindants ' Answering Brief to PlaintzFs 'Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, R, Vol. IV, p. 714. see also R, Vol. V, p. 932 (wherein Halvorsons 
state: "Camps Canyon Road is an unrecorded prescriptive right of waym).' 
' The trial court also addressed Halvorsons' vain attempt to nullify these admissions and the 
public road's status in the following footnote of the Opinion and Order: 
The Plaintiffs set forth a novel argument that the original right-of-way was 
nullified based upon alterations made by the Highway District in 1996. The 
Plaintiffs relied on District of Columbia v. Robinson, 180 U.S. 92,2 1 S.Ct. 283, 
The record in this case also establishes the public has used the road for many years and 
that the Highway District has maintained the road at the expense of the public at least since 1974, 
Payne Affidavit, R, Vol. IV, p. 637. These facts alone satisfy the requirements for determining 
that Camps Canyon Road is a public highway. As set forth in Ada County Highway District v. 
Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008): 
The requirements for determining whether a public highway exists are set forth in 
LC. § 40-202. According to the statute, a public road may be acquired: (1) if the 
public uses the road for a period of five years, and (2) the road is worked and kept 
up at the expense of the public. LC. § 40-202(3); Floyd v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 137 
Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d 863, 869 (2002). The highway district has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that public rights were established. 
See Floyd, 137 Idaho at 724, 52 P.3d at 869. 
Public status of the roadway can be established by proof of regular maintenance 
and extensive public use. Id. There is no intent requirement to create a public road 
pursuant to LC. 8 40-202(3). Id. at 727, 52 P.3d at 872. "[TJhe primary factual 
questions are the frequency, nature and quality of the public's use and 
maintenance." Id. The public must use the road regularly, and the use must be 
more than only casual or desultory. Burrup, 114 Idaho at 53,753 P.2d at 264. 
Maintenance need only be work and repairs that are reasonably necessary; it is not 
necessary maintenance be performed in each of the five consecutive years or 
through the entire length of the road. Floyd, 137 Idaho at 724, 52 P.3d at 869 
(citing Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 16, 784 P.2d 339, 346 (Ct.App.1989); State 
v. Nesbitt, 79 Idaho 1,6,310 P.2d 787,790 (1957), overruled on other grounds by 
French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950,751 P.2d 98 (1988)). 
45 L.Ed. 440 (1901) in support of this theory. However, the facts of District of 
Columbia v. Robinson can be distinguished from the case at hand because the 
easement addressed in that case was of smaller proportion: specifically, the 
easement was limited to the width of the roadway surface. [continued] 
Id. at 108-09,21 S.Ct. at 289. Nothing within the case supports the Plaintiffs' 
argument that the width of Camps Canyon Road is limited to the surface of the 
roadway. Further, nothing within District of Columbia v. Robinson supports the 
Plaintiffs' novel theory of nullification of the width of the original right of way. 
Id. at 365-66, 179 P.3d at 328-29. 
Camps Canyon Road shall not be less than fifty feet (50') wide. 
Halvorsons' claims in this case and Halvorson's claims on appeal are rooted in the notion 
that the width of Camps Canyon Road is limited to the traveled surface of the roadway. This 
notion is contrary to law as applied to the facts of this case. Idaho Code 5 40-23 12 establishes 
that the minimum width of a public highway in Idaho is fif y feet. 
All highways, except bridges and those located within cities, shall be not less than 
fifty (50) feet wide, except those of a lesser width presently existing, and may be 
as wide as required for proper construction and maintenance in the discretion of 
the authority in charge of the construction and maintenance. Bridges located 
outside incorporated cities shall be the same width to and across the river, creek 
or stream as the highway leading to it. 
LC. § 40-2312. The District Court determined that "there is no evidence in the record 
before this Court that Camps Canyon Road existed prior to 1887" and concluded that the 
statute's exception to the fifty foot width requirement (. .."except those of a lesser width 
presently existing.. . .") was "inapplicable to the case at hand." Opinion and Order, R, 
Vol. VII, p. 1461. 
There is a long history in Idaho case law which explains and supports the purpose 
of a public highway being a minimum width of fifty feet. This purpose was set 
forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Mesewey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133,93 P. 
780 (1908). 
It would seem that the right acquired by prescription and user 
cames with it such width as is reasonably necessary for the 
reasonable convenience of the traveling public, and, where the 
public have acquired the easement, the land subject to it has passed 
under the jurisdiction of the public authorities for the purpose of 
keeping the same in proper condition for the enjoyment thereof by 
the public. See Whitesides v. Green, supra. And, where the right is 
so acquired, such width must be determined fiom a consideration 
of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. However, it 
must be borne in mind that the statute fixes the width of highways 
at not less than 50 feet, and common experience shows that width 
no more than sufficient for the proper keeping up and repair of 
roads generally. 
Id. at 148,93 P. at 785 While Mesewey was decided in 1908, it was more 
recently discussed in 1983, in Bentel v. Bannock County, 104 Idaho 130,656 P.2d 
1383 (1983). In Bentel, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the fifty foot width 
of a public highway was necessary not only for proper upkeep and repair of roads, 
but also for foreseeable public uses, such as sewage systems, runoff, 
communications and other services. 
Mesewey simply held that the state need not claim legal title to a 
highway in an action filed to protect the public interest in a 
prescriptive roadway easement. It did not address the scope of such 
easements, other than that one holding of the case is that as to 
width a 50 foot easement denied by the trial court, being in line 
with Sec. 932, Rev.Stat. (now LC. 9 40-904) will be upheld, 
because "common experience shows that width [is] no more than 
sufficient for the proper keeping up and repair of roads generally." 
In more contemporary decisions, other jurisdictions have held the 
scope of such easements comprehensive enough to include 
reasonably foreseeable public uses of such roadways, such as 
subsurface installations for sewage, runoff, communications and 
other services necessary to the increased quality of life which 
generally accompanies the growth of civilization. "[A] highway 
easement acquired by prescription is no less comprehensive than 
one acquired by grant, dedication or condemnation." 
Id. at 133, 656 P.2d at 1386 (internal citations omitted) 
Thus, statutory authority establishes that fifty feet is the minimum width of a 
public highway in Idaho. This minimum width encompasses the surface area of 
the roadway, as well as area that is commonly referred to as the right of way. The 
right of way is that area of undeveloped land next to the highway which is 
necessary for the proper upkeep and repair of the road. 
Opinion and Order, R, Vol. VII, pp. 1461-62. 
Halvorsons' position, that the width of a public highway should he limited to the actual 
surface of the roadway, is contrary to statutory authority, would defeat the purpose of that statute 
as upheld by Idaho courts throughout its long history and would result in the inability of 
governmental entities exercising jurisdiction over public highways to properly keep and improve 
public highways "for the reasonable convenience of the traveling public" and "as the increased 
travel and the exogenous of the public may require. Id. The District Court's determination that 
"Camps Canyon Road is a public highway which spans the width of fifty feet. . . encompasses 
the surface of the roadway, as well as right of way necessary for the proper upkeep and repair of 
the road" should be sustained. Opinion and Order, R, Vol. VII, p. 1463. 
The District Court also properly determined the "character, width, length and 
location ...." of Camps Canyon Road by reference to the official map of the Highway District's 
system and to the road's centerline, "which has remained the same since 1974" and "establishes 
the midpoint of the fifty foot span." Id. See Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767,774, 133 P.3d 
1232,1239 (2006); see also Kosanke v. Kopp, 74 Idaho 302,261 P.2d 815 (1953). Payne 
Affidavit, R, Vol. IV, p. 638. 
The Hihwav District's maintenance of and improvements to Camvs Canvon Road have 
occurred entirelv within the legal width of Camvs Canvon Road. 
Halvorson variously contends that the Highway District has damaged the Halvorsons and 
their property by pushing gravel six inches to the northeast, plowing snow, pushing a wind-fallen 
tree and issuing a driveway permit to their neighbor. R, Vol. 11, p. 322; Id. at 407-408; R, Vol. 
VI, p. 1348-50. The Highway District, however, has established through the Payne Affidavit, 
Ameberg Affidavit, Third Affidavit of Dan Payne, and Hodge Affidavit that any such actions 
taken by the Highway District to improve and maintain Camps Canyon Road have occurred 
within the fifty foot width of the road, the location and centerline of which has not changed to 
any significant degree since at least 1940. R, Vol. IV, p. 637-638; R, Vol. VII, p. 1423; R, Vol. 
IV, p. 645; R, Vol. VI, p. 1144-46. 
The principal damages claimed by Halvorsons are to a fence Halvorson constructed on 
his property in 1997. R, Vol VI, p. 1350-51. That fence, however, was constructed within the 
fifty foot width of Camps Canyon Road and, in places, within fifteen feet of the centerline of 
Camps Canyon Road. Payne Affidavit, R, Vol. IV, p. 639. 
The District Court correctly concluded based on the record that Halvorsons: 
"...have failed to refute the facts presented by the Highway Department [sic] 
establishing that the centerline of the roadway has not substantially moved and 
that any repairs to the road have been done within the right of way of the road. In 
a response to a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must set forth 
"specific facts" showing a genuine issue. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Verbillis v. Dependable 
Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335,337,689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). 
The Plaintiffs have presented evidence that their fence was damaged by the 
defendants in the course of maintaining the road. The Plaintiffs' belief that the 
width of the roadway is limited to the surface of the road, and the fact that their 
fence is near the surface of the roadway does not change the width of the entire 
public highway or create an issue of fact. The Plaintiffs cannot rely on the fact 
that their fence is located within the right of way to establish possession of 
property within the right of way. 
Possession and use of an unused portion of a highway by an 
abutting owner is not adverse to the public and cannot ripen into a 
right or title by lapse of time no matter how long continued. Nor 
does such possession and use, even though by express permission 
of the public authority, work an estoppel against the public use. 
Even in the case of a highway established by user, all portions of 
the highway right of way need not be maintained and kept up at 
public expense. In Boise City v. Sinsel, supra,we held that an 
abutting owner who erected and maintained a building on a portion 
of a public street under a permit granted by the city council, for a 
period of 25 years, did not acquire a right to such occupancy, and 
that the city was not estopped to cancel the permit and require the 
removal of the building. 
Rich v. Burdick, 83 Idaho 335,345,362 P.2d 1088, 1094 (1961) internal citations 
omitted). The Plaintiffs have not obtained any possessory rights to land within 
the fifty foot width of the road, thus, the Plaintiffs' claims with regard to the fence 
fail. 
Opinion and Order, R, Vol. VII, p. 1465-66. Photographs in this record fhrther demonstrate the 
extent to which the Highway District has diligently attempted to avoid causing harm to 
Plaintiffs' fence. R. Vol VII, pp. 1376-7, 138 1-2, 1387. 
Halvorsons have offered no evidence on this record to show that the Highway District bas 
done any act outside the minimum fifty foot width of Camps Canyon Road to damage 
Halvorsons or their property. Halvorson merely argues on appeal that the Highway District's 
authority is limited to a lesser width, which assertion is without Iegal basis. 
Halvorson's takings claims fail because the Highway District has acted within its statutory 
authority. 
Halvorson argues that the Highway District's actions in placing gravel on the roadway 
and issuing an approach permit to Mr. Wagner, the neighbor, have taken the Halvorsons' 
property through "encroachment," "deprivations," "use of our land," "misappropriations," "loss 
of right to exclude others," widening," "crossing property line," "seizure," "inverse 
condemnation" and other similar phrases. Complaint, R, Vol. I, pp. 10-33. However, as 
discussed above, because the Highway District's actions occurred within the public right of way, 
there has been no taking of Halvorsons' property. Halvorson cannot maintain an inverse 
condemnation action "unless there has actually been a taking" of [Halvorsons'] property. KMSZ 
LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 579-560,67 P.3d 56,59-60 (2003). See also Reisenauer 
v. State ofldaho, Department ofHighways, 120 Idaho 36,40,813 P.2d 375,379 (Ct. App. 1991) 
("...when the wrought portion of a highway is widened so as to include the whole of the original 
location. .. and the owner of the fee has no ground for complaint, even if he is deprived of 
privileges in the land taken which he had previously enjoyed.. .."). 
The threshold step in a takings inquiry, whether in a case of a regulatory or physical 
nature, "is to determine whether the Plaintiffs ever possessed the property interest they now 
claim has been taken by the challenged governmental action." See Kim v. City of New York, 681 
N.E.2d 312,314 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1027, 112 S.Ct. 2886,2899. The purpose of this "logically antecedent inquiry into the 
nature of the owners' estate" is to determine whether principles of the allegedly taken property 
was a "stick in the bundle of property rights" acquired by the owner. (Lucas, supra, 505 U.S. at 
1027, 112 S.Ct. at 2899). 
It is evident, applying Idaho highway law as discussed hereinabove, that Halvorsons' 
"bundle of property rights" when they acquired their property in 1996 was subject to the rights of 
the public to utilize the minimum 50-foot wide right-of-way of Camps Canyon Road for public 
highway purposes and to the statutory authority of the Highway District to maintain and improve 
that public right-of-way. As a result, Halvorsons cannot maintain an inverse condemnation 
claim against the Highway District based upon this record of the Highway District's actions in 
the properly discharging its statutory responsibilities related to Camps Canyon Road. 
Halvorson also argues, without proof of any kind, that there has been an abandonment or 
extinguishnent of the public's rights in Camps Canyon Road, and that any widening constitutes 
an unlawful taking of their property. Halvorsons' argument that Camps Canyon Road "may be 
informally abandoned.. ." is unpersuasive, is unsupported in law and cannot be upheld. 
Floyd v. Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718,728,52 P.3d 863,873 (2002). 
Halvorson has also challenged the constitutionality of Idaho Code section 40-202(3). 
That issue, however, was recently decided in Ada County District v. Total Success Investments, 
LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008), wherein the Court held the statute "not 
unconstitutional on its face" while acknowledging that the applicable limitations provision of 
Idaho Code 5 5-224 to challenge another's possession of one's property was "four years from the 
accrual of the cause of action." Id. at 369, P.3d at 332. As the estabIishment of Camps Canyon 
Road as a public road occurred years before Halvorsons' acquired their property, Halvorsons are 
time barred from bringing any claim challenging the establishment of the public's rights in 
Camps Canyon Road. 
In this case, Halvorsons' construction of a fence within the public right of way has 
provided the primary motivation for asserting his taking claims. However, his location of that 
fence does not vest private rights in contravention to the public's rights in Camps Canyon Road. 
In Rich v. Burdick, 83 Idaho 335,362 P.2d 1088 (1961), the Idaho Supreme Court, ruling on a 
case involving a structure that had been placed in a public road, held: 
Even in the case of a highway established by user, all portions of the highway 
right of way need not he maintained and kept up at public expense. Kosanke v. 
Kopp, 74 Idaho 302,261 P.2d 815. In Boise City v. Sinsel, supra, we held that an 
abutting owner who erected and maintained a building on a portion of a public 
street under a permit granted by the city council, for a period of 25 years, did not 
acquire a right to such occupancy, and that the city was not estopped to cancel the 
permit and require the removal of the building. 
Id. at 345,362 P.2d at 1094. 
As to Halvorson's claim that the Highway District's issuance of access permit constituted 
a taking, the District Court found no evidence that the permit "encompassed property beyond the 
borders of the right of way of Camps Canyon Road." Opinion and Order, R, Vol. VII, p. 1468- 
69. Halvorson also asserts takings claims related to the issuance of the access permit under the 
United States and State of Idaho Constitutions and alleges damages to Halvorsons' property from 
the Wagners' construction of a driveway. Wagners abandoned that initial driveway by June, 
2006, and filled in the area that had been excavated. Payne Second Af$davit, par. 10, R, Vol. VI, 
p. 1212. The Highway District issued a permit hut did not occupy or undertake any construction 
activity on Halvorsons' property and, as a result, did not take Halvorsons' property or trespass 
upon Halvorsons' property. R, Vol. VI, pp. 121 1-13. 
To assert a claim against the Highway District for inverse condemnation, Halvorson 
"must establish that treatment under takings law, as opposed to tort law is appropriate under the 
circumstances." Ridge Line, Inc. v. Unitedstates, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. Ct. App. 
3003). The Ridge Line Court described the "tort-taking inquiry" as requiring consideration of 
"whether the effects" the party "experienced were the predictable result of the government's 
action and whether the government's actions were sufficiently substantial to justify a taking." Id. 
Elaborating on this two-part analysis, the Court stated: 
'Inverse condemnation law is tied to and parallels, tort law.' 9 PatrickJ. Rohan 
&Melvin A. Reskin, Nichols on Eminent Domain $ 34.03[1] (3d ed. 1980 & 
Supp. 2002). Thus, not every "invasion" of private property resulting from 
government activity amounts to an appropriation. Id. The line distinguishing 
potential physical takings from possible torts is drawn by a two-part inquiry. 
First, a property loss compensable as a taking only results when the govemment 
intends to invade a protected property interest or the asserted invasion is the 
"direct, natural, or probable result of an authorized activity and not the incidental 
or consequential injury inflicted by the action.' 
... 
Second, the nature and magnitude of the government action must be considered. 
Even where the effects of the government action are predictable, to constitute a 
taking, an invasion must appropriate a benefit to the govemment at the expense 
of the property owner, or at least preempt the owners' right to enjoy his property 
for an extended period of time, rather than merely inflict an injury that reduces its 
value. 
Id. at 1355-1356. 
The Highway District's diligent issuance of an access permit followed established 
Highway District policies and procedures, including a thorough inspection by its foreman. 
Second Payne Afidavit, par. 10-1 1, R, Vol. VI, p. 1212. In no measure did the Highway 
District's action not "appropriate a benefit to the govemment at the expense of the property 
owner" or "preempt the owners' right to enjoy his property for an extended period of time." 
Ridgeline, supra at 1356. Courts are required to consider "whether the government's 
interference was substantial and frequent enough to rise to the level of a taking.. .'[i]solated 
invasions, such as one or two floodings ..., do not make a taking.. ., but repeated invasions of the 
same type have often been held to result in an involuntary servitude." Id. (citations omitted). 
The Highway District neither appropriated "a benefit to the government" nor did it preempt 
Halvorsons' "right to enjoy.. .for an extended period of time." Such conduct is not cognizable 
under takings law, rather, it may only be pursued under tort law principles, and as discussed later 
in this Brief, Halvorsons are barred from pursuing tort relief because of their failure to timely file 
a notice of tort claim in regard to this alleged conduct. 
D. Halvorson's due vrocess claims are without merit. 
Halvorson's vrocedural due process claims are without merit. 
Halvorson makes a variety of assertions regarding alleged violations of the Halvorsons' 
due process rights for lack of notice and the right to be heard prior to Highway District activities 
such as improving and maintaining Camps Canyon Road and issuing permits. 
Procedural due process "basically requires that a person, whose protected rights 
are being adjudicated, is afforded an opportunity to be heard in a timely manner." 
Powers V. Canyon County, 108 Idaho 967,969,703 P.2d 1342,1344 (1985). 
There must be notice and the opportunity to be heard must "occur at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner.. . ." Cowan v. Bd. ofComm 'rs, 143 Idaho 501, 
512, 148 P.3d 1247, 1258 (2006) (quoting Aberdeen-Springfield Canal co. v. 
Peiper, 133 Idaho 82,91,982 P.2d 917,926 (1999)) (internal quotations omitted.) 
Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360,371, 179 P.3d 
323,334 (2008). 
The Highway District is granted broad and exclusive authority to supervise public 
highways within its jurisdiction. This authority expressly provides the Highway District 
commissioners, including Respondents Arneberg, Clyde and Hansen, with "full power to 
construct, maintain, repair.. . and improve all highways within their system.. . ." Idaho Code 5 
40-1310(1). There has been no showing by Halvorson that the Highway District is required by 
Idaho statute to conduct hearings before improving a public road or issuing access permits. 
The Highway District is well within its legal rights to improve and widen a road without 
holding a public hearing when that improvement occurs within the Highway District's public right- 
of-way as is the record status of this case. Due process is not implicated when protected rights are 
not being adjudicated. Id. Road grading and snow plowing are not adjudications. Moreover, even 
if the District's actions resulted in the District making a claim to private property, such would not be 
a violation of Halvorsons' due process rights even if notice had been provided. Total Success, 
supra at 372, P.3d at 371. (". . .[A]dequate notice is provided by "the statute itself, LC. $ 40-202(3), 
which provides that highways include those used and maintained by the public for five years.") See 
also Powers v. Canyon County, 108 Idaho 967,970,703 P.2d 1342,1345 (1985). 
Issuance of a driveway permit does not require a due process hearing. Idaho Code $40- 
1310 (8) expressly delegates to the Highway District full supervisory authority "to control access to 
said public highways.. .."; This exercise of authority is what occurred in connection with issuance 
of the access permit to Wagners. Title 40 of the Idaho Code does not require more. 
Halvorsons' constitutional due Drocess claims under the constitutions are without merit. 
Halvorson brings due process claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983, which provides for 
civil liability for any person who. under color of state law, subjects another "to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and bylaws." 42 U.S.C. $ 1983. 
Section 1983 "does not create a cause of action," rather, it provides a vehicle for courts to review 
alleged violations of constitutional or statutory law. See Aardvark Childcare and Learning 
Center, Inc. v. Township of Concord, 401 F. Supp. 2d 427,444 (East. Dist. Pa. 2005). See also 
BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 176, 108 P.3d 315,323 (2004). 
Halvorson's principal contentions in this regard are that Halvorsons' constitutionally 
protected property rights under the FiRh and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution as well as numerous Idaho 
statutes are violated by the Highway District's widening of Camps Canyon Road and by the 
Highway District's "custom and policy" in relying upon Idaho Code section 40-23 12 and the 
Idaho Supreme Court's holdings in Meservey and its progeny to maintain and improve public 
prescriptive roadways within a 50-foot width. Halvorson also contends that these substantive 
due process rights were violated by the District's issuance of the Wagners' access permit. 
Legal standards applicable to a 5 1983 claim are set forth as follows: 
In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, plaintiffs must establish that: 1) a 
deprivation of a constitutionally or federally secured right occurred, and 2) the 
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. 
. . . 
In order "to prevail on a non-legislative substantive due process claim, 'a 
plaintiff must establish as a threshold matter that he has a protected property 
interest to which the Fourteenth Amendment's due process protections applies."' 
. . . 
Real property ownership is indisputably a property interest protected by 
substantive due process. 
~ . .  
The subsequent inquiry is whether defendants' actions interfered with plaintiffs' 
use and enjoyment of their land to a degree that implicates substantive due 
process. In United Artists Theatre Circuit v. firrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 
2003), the third circuit held that in order to challenge a municipal land-use 
decision as a violation of substantive due process plaintiffs must show that the 
defendants' conduct "shocks the conscience." Id. at 400 (relying on standard set 
in County ofSacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 
1043 (1998)). The court noted that "[lland use decisions are matters of local 
concern, and such disputes should not be transformed into substantive due 
process claims based only on allegations that government officials acted with 
improper motives."' Id. at 402. In fact, only "conduct intended to injure in some 
way unjustifiable by any government interest" is the kind of action most likely to 
be deemed "conscience shocking." County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. 833,849, 
118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). 
Aardvark, supra at 444-445. 
In Maresh v. State Department ofHealth and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 
970 P.2d 14 (1988), the Idaho Supreme court further explained the state court's role in resolving 
substantive due process claims as follows: 
To determine whether an individual's due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment have been violated, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. It 
must first decide whether the individual's threatened interest is a liberty or 
property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment." Schevers v. State, 129 
Idaho 573,575,930 P.2d 603,605 (1996) (citing Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. 
Dist. No. 2., 128 Idaho 714,722,918 P.2d 583,591 (1996)); see also, True v. 
Dep 't ofHealth and Welfare, 103 Idaho 151,645 P.2d 891 (1982) (citing Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565,95 S.Ct. 729,42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975)). Only after a court 
finds a liberty or property interest will it reach the next step of analysis, in which 
it determines what process is due. Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573,575,930 
P.2d 603,605. 
As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "[tlhe requirements of procedural 
due process apply only to the deprivation of interest encompassed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Board ofRegents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,569,92 S.Ct. 2701,2705,33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 
Accordingly, the existence of [a party's] right to due process protections 
regarding her request to participate in the.. .depends on whether [the party's] 
interest.. .is within the scope of the liberty or property language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The United States Supreme court has noted that property interests are 
"created. ..by existing rules,. ..such as state law." Id. Likewise, this Court has 
indicated that "determination of whether a particular right or privilege is a 
property interest is a matter of state law." Ferguson v. Bd. of Trustees of Bonner 
Cty. Sch., 98 Idaho 359,564 P.2d 971,975 (1977) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 
U.S. 341,96 S.Ct. 2074,48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976)). Further determining the 
existence of a liberty or property interest depends on the "construction of the 
relevant statutes," and the "nature of the interest at stake." True, 103 Idaho at 
154,645 P.2d 891 (citing Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 8 10-9, at 515-16 
(1978)). Hence, whether a property interest exists can be determined only by an 
examination of the particular statute or ordinance in question. Bishop, U.S. 341, 
96 S.Ct. 2074. 
Id. at 226, P.2d at 19. 
Applying these standards to Halvorson's motions for summary judgment and because the 
facts on this record establish that the District acted within its lawful statutory authority in 
managing Camps Canyon Road for public use, as those actions have been construed by Idaho 
courts throughout the State's history, the Highway District's actions have not "interfered" with 
Halvorsons' "use and enjoyment of their land" to any degree much less "to a degree that 
implicates substantive due process" or "shocks the conscience." Aardvark, supra at 445. 
The United States Supreme Court has long viewed with disfavor "bare allegations of 
malice" such as are spewed forth against the Highway District in Halvorson's briefs and 
affidavits in this case and has held, under such circumstances, that 
governmental officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded 
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555,565,98 S.Ct. 855,861, 
55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S., at 322, 95 S.Ct., at 1001. 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,817-818, 102 S.Ct. 2727,2738 (1982). The Harlow Court 
adopted a test designed to "avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution 
of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment, that focuses on the "objective legal 
reasonableness of an official's conduct" in determining whether the official "could be expected 
to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights." Id. at 2738 - 2739. 
The Harlow Court also opined that "where an official's duties legitimately require action in 
which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by 
action taken 'with independence and without fear of consequences."' Id. at 2739 [citation 
omitted]. This doctrine applies directly to the circumstances of the instant case and this qualified 
immunity protects the individual Defendants in their performance of discretionary functions 
fiom civil damages and provides independent authority for the dismissal of all claims against 
individual Defendants, who, the record aptly demonstrates, acted in accordance with applicable 
law as known to them at the time of such actions. In addition, Halvorson has failed to establish 
as a threshold matter in the proof of a due process violation, any alleged arbitrary action by the 
individual Respondents' that "can properly be characterized as conscience-shocking in a 
constitutional sense." United Artists, supra at 399, citing Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a New York land use case that dealt with 
similar snow plowing and road widening issues, reached the following decision and made the 
following observations: 
To establish a substantive due process violation, the [plaintiffs] must show that 
the Town's alleged acts against their land were "arbitrary," conscience- 
shocking," or "oppressive in the constitutional sense," not merely "incorrect or 
ill-advised." Lowrance v. C.O.S. AchtyZ, 20 F.3d 529,537 (2d Cir. 1994) 
. . . 
... although the snow plowing and paving may have been incorrect or ill-advised, 
such actions on the part of the Town were not so outrageous and arbitrary as to 
implicate the [Plaintiffs'] substantive due process rights. Rather, they 
constituted, at most, occasional unlawful encroachments on the "Reserved for 
Parking" parcel necessitated by the Town's performance of its municipal duties. 
An y dispute regarding such actions is best resolved in state court. Zahra v. 
Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674,680 (2d Cir.1995) ("[Tlhe Due Process Clause 
does not function as a general overseer of the arbitrariness in state and local land- 
use decisions; in our federal system, that is the province of the state courts."). 
Ferran v. Town ofNassau, 471 F.3d 363,369-370 (2006). 
Likewise, Respondents' conduct has not been "conscience-shocking" in the least. 
Halvorson has totally failed to meet any required legal tests to establish a violation, and 
Halvorson's substantive due process claims must fail. 
Halvorson's claim of be in^ denied a hearing pursuant to LC. 6 40-203A is without merit. 
Halvorsons failed and/or refused to request a validation hearing and to pay a reasonable 
fee under Idaho Code 5 40-203A. Second Affidavit of Dan Carscallen, R, Vol. VI, p. 1159. The 
District Court determined that the Highway District is not required to initiate validation 
proceedings unless the property owner initiated the proceedings and paid the required fee, and 
"there is no evidence in this record" that such had occurred. Opinion and Order, R, Vol. VII, p. 
1474. There is no due process violation under these circumstances. 
E. HaIvorson's remaining claims are without merit. 
Halvorson's claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act are without merit. 
The Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code sections 6-901 et seq. ("ITCA") requires 
claimants against political subdivisions to submit a written "claim" to the clerk or secretary of the 
political subdivision within 180 days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been 
discovered. Idaho Code 9 6-906. This 180-day period begins to run when the wrongful acts occur. 
Mitchell v. Bingham Mem. Hosp., 130 Idaho 420 (1997). All ITCA claims must be written. Idaho 
Code 5 6-902(7). County highway district are political subdivisions for the purposes of the ITCA. 
Curl v. Indian Springs Natatorium, Znc., 97 Idaho 637 (1976). Where the ITCA bars an action, 
summary judgment is appropriate. Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Halvorsons filed a Tort Claim Notice with the Highway District on November 6,2007. 
Second Affidavit of Dan Carscallen, R, Vol. VI, pp. 1158, 1161-1 164. All of Halvorsons' claims 
for damages against the Highway District under ITCA, prior to May 8,2007, being 180 days 
prior to the Highway District's receipt of Halvorsons' Notice on November 6,2007, and all 
Halvorsons' claims for which a notice of tort claim is required but which are not described in 
Halvorsons' Notice must be dismissed for failure to comply with the notice requirements 
mandated by Idaho Code sections 6-905,907 and 908. Overman v. Klein, 103 Idaho 795,797, 
654 P2d 888, 890 (1982). Accordingly, the District Court dismissed all tort claims alleged by 
Halvorsons which arose prior to May 8,2007. 
The barred claims include claims described in Halvorsons' Notice for the reason that 
those claims arose more than 180 days prior to Halvorsons' filing, as follows: claims for 
damages to Plaintiffs' fence in 2004,2005 and 2006 and claims for damages to Plaintiffs' real 
property, including from construction of the Wagners' driveway in 2006, and claims for damages 
from any alleged trespass, and/or nuisance from 1996 through May 8,2007. Second Affidavit of 
Dan Carscallen, R, Vol. VI, pp. 1 161 -1 164. 5 1 1. E. 
The barred claims also include claims not described at all in Halvorsons' Notice, as 
follows: claims that the Highway District failed to survey and record surveys in 1996,2005 and 
2006, claims that the Highway District failed to keep andlor maintain Highway District records 
in 1996, 2005 and 2006, claims that the individual commissioners misrepresented information. 
Complaint, R. Vol I, pp. 8-34.See Idaho Code section 6-907; Cook v. State ofIdaho, 133 Idaho 
288,298,985 P.2d 1150, 1160 (1999). 
Halvorsons' claims against individual commissioners and emplovee are without metit 
The Highway District and the individual commissioners and employee are not liable for 
Halvorsons' claims arising out of alleged acts or omission of these individuals, exercising 
ordinary care, "in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a statutory.. . function.. . ." 
Idaho Code section 6-904. Halvorson has alleged numerous violations by Respondents of such 
statutory functions, including those statutes referenced in the Complaint, namely Idaho Code 
sections 7-701 et seq., 40-203 A, 208,604,605,608, 1307, 1310, 131 1, 1312, 1336,2012,2302 
and 2317,67-5232 and 8001 et seq. R, Vol. I, pp. 8-34. 
ITCA establishes a "rebuttable presumption that any act or omission of an employee 
within the terms and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his 
employment and without malice or criminal intent." Idaho Code section 6-903 (e). Halvorsons' 
Complaint does not set forth any facts that rebut the presumption that such conduct was within 
the course and scope of employment or that show any individual Respondents did not exercise 
ordinary care in the performance of these functions. To the contrary, Dan Payne's and Dan 
Carscallen's affidavits detail the Disttict's due diligence in all operational matters related to this 
proceeding. Dismissal of claims of violation of statutory duties against the Highway District and 
all individual Respondents and should be affirmed. 
Halvorson claims that the Highway District has abused its discretion by creating 
improper standards and policies regarding the Highway District's management of prescriptive 
right of ways. These claims against the Highway District's creation and implementation of 
policies likewise fail under the express language of Idaho Code 5 60-904 which immunizes the 
Highway District and the individual foreman and commissioners for the "exercise.. .failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.. .whether or not the discretion be abused." 
Id. The legislature has provided such immunity from suit under the "discretionary function" 
exception to ITCA. The Idaho Supreme Court has set forth the "planning/operational" test for 
determining whether this immunity exists, and, under this test, a party is immune from activities 
involving "policy judgments and decision making." United Pacz3c Railroad Company v. State 
of Idaho, 654 F .  Sup. 1236, 1242 (1987) (Dist. Ct. Idaho) (citing Sterling v. Bloom, 11 1 Idaho 
21 1,723 P2d 755 (1986). Accordingly, dismissal of Halvorsons' claims related to policy and 
standards issues should be affirmed. 
Halvorson also claims that the Highway District commissioners' and employee's 
issuance of a driveway permit to the Wagners violates their duties to Halvorsons. Idaho Code 5 
6-904B(3), however, states, in part, as follows: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and 
swpe of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and without 
gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6- 
904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which: 
. . . 
3. Arises out of the issuance.. .or revocation of.. .a permit.. .approval.. .or similar 
authorization. 
Idaho Code 5 6-904B(3). 
The rebuttable prescription under Idaho Code 5 6-903(e) is that the individual Respondents acted 
within the course and scope of employment and without malice or criminal intent applies to the 
issuance of a permit. While the immunity of section 6-904B(3) could be breached upon proof 
that rebuts the presumption or upon proof of "gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton 
conduct," there is substantial evidence on this record that individual Respondents used ordinary 
care in the issuance and revocation. Halvorsons have set forth no admissible facts to the 
contrary. Dismissal of all of Halvorsons' claims as to issuance of this permit should be affirmed. 
Halvorson's other remaining claims are infirm and without merit. 
Dismissal of Halvorsons' other claims should be affirmed as a matter of law for various 
reasons. Halvorsons have sprinkled their Complaint and other writings with vague assertions that 
the District has violated their rights to equal protection of the law. These averments have been 
made without any offer of evidence that Halvorsons have been "singled out" by the Highway 
District for discriminatory treatment. The evidence on this record is to the contrary in that the 
Highway District officials testify that their road improvement policies are applied uniformly and, 
in fact, that this is the only lawsuit in institutional memory in which taking and due process 
claims have been made against the Highway District. Arneberg Affidavit, R, Vol. IV, pp. 645- 
646. Halvorsons have not produced any particularized evidence to support any equal protection 
claim and any such claims must fail and their dismissal affirmed. See Aardvark, supra at 446- 
448. 
Halvorsons claim relief based on a number of theories that are not supported by law. Where 
the Halvorsons have failed to establish their prima facie case, summary judgment is appropriate. 
See Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 881,828 P.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1992) . 
We note, however, that the existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary 
judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to his case, and on which he will bear the burden of 
proof at trial. See Jerome 7lzriJhuay Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615,717 P.2d 
1033 (1986);see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 
2552,91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1532 (1 1" Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1 103,111 S.Ct 1003,112 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1991). Facts 
in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima 
facie case. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue of material fact," since 
a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving 
party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322- 
33, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-58. This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually unsupported 
claims prior to trial. 
Id. at 774, 828 P.2d at 337. 
A claim has been satisfactorily stated if it contains "a concise statement of the facts constituting the 
cause of action and a demand for relief." Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323,715 P.2d 993 (1986) 
(citing I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1)(2)). The complaint must be phrased as a series of numbered paragraphs, 
each of which is limited to a single set of circumstances. Id. R. Civ. P. lo@) Halvorsons' claims, 
when taken together, are not concise, as required by Rule 8(a)(1)(2). Halvorsons' Complaint's 
length, disorganization, repetitiveness and lack of factual support render Halvorsons' Complaint 
unsatisfactory as to claims that are difficult to ascertain. 
Halvorsons complain of some conduct that does not support any cognizable claim - e.g., 
"the conduct of the defendants.. .has been deliberate, flagrant, arbitrary, and offensive to the sense 
of democracy and to the sense of good government ...." (Complaint, R. Vol. I, pp. 8-35 at 9 ILU.), 
"the lack of any agency structure and the arbitrary disregard to resolve disputes and violations, the 
fomenting of neighborly disputes.. .," (Id. at 5 E and see also, § E. 6., P., P.2, Q.f.xiii.(a), 
"negotiating in bad faith" (Id.), "misrepresentation of statements and legal views and rulings.. .and 
questionable applications of or statements.. .of standards (Id at 5 Q.f.xii; see also, § Q.f.xiii(b)), 
"violated the doctrine of quasi-estoppel" (Id. at §Q.f.xiii(c)) and "testimony.. .flagrantly intended to 
thwart any and all remedies.. ." (Id. at 5 R.(6).) . 
Other of Halvorsons' claims fail to state any cause of action. Halvorsons' Complaint 
specifically alleges violation of at least three statutory criminal provisions: 18-7001, malicious 
injury to property; 5 18-7008, trespass; and, 5 18-7012 destruction of fences. Halvorsons, as civil 
litigants, have no authority to prosecute criminal offenses, and so these allegations facially fail to 
state any claim. Other Halvorsons' claims fail for lack of any factual assertion and include those 
related to the Highway District's alleged failure to train and failure to supervise, the claim for 
punitive damages and other claims perhaps unmentioned as a result of the disorganization and 
complexity of Halvorson's Complaint and briefing and the difficulty in ascertaining claims. The 
District Court's dismissal of all thee claims should be affirmed. 
F. Halvorsons' motions are without merit. 
In addition to Halvorsons' motion for summary judgment, various other motions were made 
as part of Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgments and Other Motions Submitted January 
26, 2009, and Briefand denied by the District Court in the Opinion and Order. These include a 
motion to amend the complaint, a motion to compel discovery, motions for reconsideration, and 
motions for sanctions against Respondents. 
Denial of Halvorsons' motion to amend the complaint to encompass any claim that 
conforms to the evidence should be affirmed because the request is broad, encompassing a 
Complaint that is twenty-seven pages long. Denial is consistent with I.R.C.P. 8(e)(l) which 
requires pleadings to "be simple, precise, and direct." 
Denial of Halvorsons' motion to compel discovery should be affirmed for the reasons that 
the District Court had previously issued a protection order due to Halvorsons' requests for discovery 
which far exceeded limitations of the rules of civil procedure. Opinion and order on Plainhxs ' 
Motions for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Protective Orders, for Enlargement of 
Time andfor Attorneys2Fees. R, Vol. N,  pp. 771-772. 
Dismissal of Halvorsons' motion for sanctions against Respondents and their counsel for 
claims of discovery abuse and spoliation of evidence should also be affirmed. See Plaintiffs ' 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Other Motions Submitted January 26,2009, and BrieJ; 
(Section 1.12 and 1.18), R, Vol. V, pp. 929-30 and 1941. The District Court found these motions to 
be without basis or merit. 
The District Court's denial of Halvorsons' motion to reconsider its previous rulings on the 
Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment filed on September 19, October 6 and October 21 
should also be affirmed. Opinion and Order, R. Vol. VII, p. 1483. 
G. Respondents should be awarded attornev fees on appeal. 
Respondents, as prevailing parties on appeal, will be entitled to attorney fees under Idaho 
Code § 12-121 , I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and I.A.R. 41(a) because Halvorson filed and pursued all causes 
of action on appeal unreasonably and without legal and factual foundation. Halvorson pursued 
claims for relief that either were inconsistent with their position that Camps Canyon Road was a 
public highway established by public use or were not supported factually. Halvorsons did not place 
a reasonable construction on Idaho law. Halvorsons pursued tort claims for property damage not 
covered by a notice of tort claim filed with the Highway District as required by Idaho law. 
Halvorson also pursued relief for conduct that does not support any cognizable claim, for criminal 
matters Halvorsons have no authority to prosecute and for claims that lacked factual assertion in 
support. This record demonstrates that Halvorson did not bring the appeal in good faith, did not 
present genuine issues of law and brought and pursued the appeal frivolously, unreasonably 
without foundation. These circumstances definitely merit an award of attorney fees. Minich v. Gem 
State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 91 1,918, 591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979). 
Respondents, as prevailing parties in an action on appeal involving a "taxing district," the 
Highway District, will be entitled, under Idaho Code 5 12-1 17 and I.A.R. 41(a) to receive an award 
of reasonable attorney fees on appeal because Halvorson, as the party on appeal against whom 
judgment will be rendered, acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. As asserted above, 
Halvorson did not bring this appeal in good faith and pursued all claims on appeal without a 
reasonable basis in law fact. These circumstances require an award of attorney fees. Daw 
v. School District 91, 136 Idaho 806,41 P.3d 234 (2001). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the record on appeal and the foregoing analyses, the relief sought by 
Respondents is to have this Court (i) affirm the District Court's Opinion and Order and (ii) make 
an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal to Respondents against Halvorson. 
Dated this 28th day of January, 2010. 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
( 
By: lh 4- 
~ o n d d  J. Landeck 
Att eys for Respondents f" 
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